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Short-term heterologous immunity after severe influenza A 
outbreaks 
S. Towers1*, Z. Feng1, & N. Hupert2 
Conventional wisdom holds that influenza A and B are such genetically dissimilar 
viruses that infection with one cannot confer cross-immunity to the other.  However, our 
examination of the records of the past 25 influenza seasons in the U.S. reveals that 
almost every time there is an early and severe influenza A outbreak, the annual influenza 
B epidemic is almost entirely suppressed (and is never suppressed otherwise).  
Temporary broad-spectrum (aka “heterologous”) immunity in the aftermath of influenza 
infection is the most direct explanation for this phenomenon.  We find a remarkably 
weak degree of temporary cross-immunity is needed to explain these patterns, and that 
indeed influenza B provides an ideal setting for the observation of heterologous immune 
effects outside of the carefully controlled environment of a laboratory. 
 
Our examination of the past 25 U.S. influenza seasons reveals that annual 
influenza B epidemics are suppressed only when they are preceded by an early 
and severe influenza A season. These observed patterns suggest that at least 
some level of cross-immunity to influenza B is conferred by prior infection with 
influenza A, despite conventional wisdom that this is not the case due to the 
many genetic differences between the two viruses (see, for instance, [1] and 
[2]). In recent years compelling evidence of temporary broad-spectrum (also 
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known as  “heterologous") cross-immunity among completely unrelated viruses 
has been observed in carefully controlled animal experiments in a laboratory 
setting [3]-[5].  However, up until now observation of these effects outside of a 
clinical setting has proved elusive, indicating that the level of cross-immunity 
conferred is likely weak. Here we calculate the level of broad cross-strain 
immunity necessary to produce the observed epidemiological patterns in the 
strain-specific influenza attack rates and we find that a remarkably small degree 
of temporary heterologous immunity is needed. We also find that the 
epidemiological properties of influenza provide an almost ideal setting for 
observation of these weak effects, and that influenza appears to be rather 
unique among common diseases in this respect. Thus the influenza 
epidemiological patterns of the past 25 years not only provide an indirect 
observation of heterologous immune effects outside of the laboratory, but also 
allow us to quantify of the degree of such immunity conferred by prior viral 
infection, contributing considerably to the understanding of immunity in the 
aftermath of infection and recovery from viral disease.  
Influenza viruses come in three varieties--A, B, and C--of which the first 
causes the majority of morbidity and mortality in humans. Influenza A not only 
slowly mutates over time (antigenic shift), but also re-assorts with animal 
influenza A viruses, such as those that circulate among birds and swine; these 
two mechanisms prevent the development of lasting humoral immunity to 
influenza A infection, and are the main reason that influenza A causes 
occasional global pandemics. In the past 25 years two main types of influenza A 
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have circulated in the population, A(H1N1) and A(H3N2), with many 
antigenically diverse subvariants. Influenza B generally circulates only in 
humans and seals, and largely due to this it can only mutate via antigenic shift, 
resulting in less genetic diversity in circulating strains compared to influenza A. 
Due to this lack of genetic diversity, humans usually acquire a partial lifelong 
immunity upon their first infection. For this reason influenza B does not cause 
pandemics, and is also usually less transmissible in the population compared to 
influenza A. Conventional wisdom holds that influenza A cannot confer immunity 
to influenza B because they are such genetically different viruses. Influenza C is 
a generally mild disease, and is of no epidemiological importance.  
Ample evidence exists in animal studies for cross-immunity between 
different subtypes of influenza A, such as A(H1N1) conferring immunity to 
A(H3N2) and/or vice-versa[6]-[9], and the phenomenon has even been 
observed in humans[10]. Models of influenza dynamics with cross-immunity 
between A strains have been developed and studied (see, for instance [11]-
[13]). However, this kind of within-type cross-immunity does not explain why 
influenza B was almost entirely suppressed in the great majority of seasons 
where a strain of influenza A peaked early, as seen in Figure 1; in the last 25 
U.S. influenza seasons between 1985-86 to 2009-10, eleven have had an 
influenza A epidemic with an early peak occurring before the end of January, 
and eight of those eleven seasons saw an almost total suppression of the usual 
B epidemic (i.e., influenza B accounted for ! 1% of the total influenza isolates 
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during those 8 seasons).
!
 The remaining 14 seasons had an influenza A 
epidemic that peaked after the end of January, and influenza B was not 
suppressed during any of those seasons and accounted for at least 12% of the 
influenza isolates in each of those years. The hypergeometric probability that 
this observed temporal pattern occurred just by random chance is  p = 0.0002.  
 
Figure 1: Summary of test isolate data of the 1985-86 to 2009-10 U.S. influenza seasons. 
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 A citation list of publicly available summaries of the past 25 U.S. influenza seasons is included 
in the supplementary information. The eight seasons out of the past 25 where influenza B was 
suppressed after an early influenza A epidemic are 1986-87 A(H1N1), 1989-90 A(H3N2), 1991-
92 A(H3N2), 1993-94 A(H3N2), 1997-98 A(H3N2), 1999-00 A(H3N2), 2003-04 A(H3N2) and, 
notably, the recent 2009-2010 A(H1N1) season. The 1995-95, 1996-97, and 2000-01 seasons 
had an early A epidemic followed by a seasonal B epidemic. 
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These temporal patterns do not appear to be due to occasional 
mismatches between the influenza B vaccine composition and the dominant 
circulating strain.  When we examine the inter-correlations between the timing of 
the dominant influenza A peak, the fraction of all isolates each season due to 
influenza B, and the fraction of B isolates each season that matched the B 
vaccine strain, we find that only the first two are significantly correlated; when 
we examine the partial correlations between these three, we also find that only 
the first and second, controlled for the third, are significantly correlated.‡ We 
also find that the timing of the dominant influenza A peak is not significantly 
correlated to the size of the influenza B epidemic in the next season. We thus 
conclude that the timing of the influenza A peak is the apparent dominant factor 
in the dynamics of the ensuing B influenza season, but that the effect is only 
temporary. 
Thus, while conventional wisdom and published reports hold that 
influenza A cannot confer immunity to influenza B, the observations of the past 
25 influenza seasons strongly suggest that highly infectious strains of influenza 
                                                
‡
 Let us refer to the timing of the influenza A peak, the fraction of all isolates each season due to 
influenza B, and the fraction of B isolates each season that matched the B vaccine strain, as X, 
Y, and Z, respectively. The correlations between X and Y, Y and Z, and X and Z are +0.67 (two-
tailed p = 0.0002), -0.29 (p = 0.16), and -0.38 (p = 0.06), respectively. The partial correlations 
between X and Y given Z, Y and Z given X, and X and Z given Y are +0.63 (two-tailed p = 
0.0007), "0.05 (p = 0.8), and "0.27 (p = 0.2), respectively.   None of the inter-correlations 
between X and the next season#s Y and Z are significant. 
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A do indeed confer at least some temporary broad-spectrum heterologous 
immunity to influenza B. A relatively recent body of work has examined 
heterologous cross-immunity[3]-[5][14], and has come to the conclusion that 
short term broad-spectrum immunity conferred by previous viral infections plays 
an important role in the functioning of the immune system. This kind of cross-
immunity has in fact been observed in the laboratory for completely unrelated 
viruses; for instance, the study presented in reference [3] finds that infection 
with influenza A appears to stimulate short term immunity to hepatitis C in mice. 
However, little is known about the degree of heterologous immunity conferred 
by viral infection.  
To calculate the degree of temporary broad-spectrum immunity needed 
to explain the observed suppression of influenza B epidemics, we examine the 
scenario where a fraction  of the population has been infected with influenza A, 
subsequently conferring broad-spectrum immunity to a fraction  of those 
people. In the immediate aftermath of an influenza A epidemic, a fraction
! 
v  of 
the population thus has vaccination immunity to influenza B, and a further 
fraction  has broad-spectrum immunity conferred by the infection with 
influenza A. The total “herd immunity” fraction in this case is thus 
.   
If 
! 
p is greater than a certain threshold, the disease will not be able to 
spread within the population (for instance, smallpox was eradicated by 
vaccinating a large enough fraction of the population to achieve sufficient herd 
immunity).  The less infectious a disease is, the smaller the threshold on 
! 
p . 
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Influenza is not very infectious compared to most other diseases with significant 
population-wide morbidity and mortality, and thus the threshold value of
! 
p is 
fairly low, and the cross-immunity
! 
"  thus does not need to be very large in order 
to suppress an influenza epidemic in the scenario described above. As 
described in Materials and Methods in the supplementary information, we use 
the epidemiological properties of influenza and current vaccination patterns to 
calculate the limit on 
! 
"  needed to suppress influenza B after an early and 
severe influenza A epidemic, and find that 
! 
"  above 0.01 to 0.31 is sufficient.  
This is considered very weak to weak cross-immunity [13]. 
We thus conclude that the observed influenza epidemiological patterns of 
the past 25 years not only provide evidence of heterologous immunity effects 
occurring outside of the carefully controlled environment of a laboratory!, but 
also, rather remarkably, allow us to quantify the degree of such immunity 
conferred after viral infection.  Our results suggesting temporary low-level 
heterologous immunity between influenza A and B are also reflected in the 
shape of the human influenza phylogenic tree; references [15]-[17] point out that 
large scale modeling cannot replicate the influenza phylogenic tree structure 
unless broad-spectrum temporary immunity (lasting one or two months) after 
influenza infection is included in the model. In fact, the analysis in [15] estimates 
                                                
! It should be pointed out here that while heterologous immune effects have been observed in 
the laboratory for other diseases, there is a surprising dearth of animal or human influenza 
challenge studies where infection with influenza A is shortly followed by challenge with influenza 
B. 
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that the magnitude of this broad immunity could be very weak (within the range 
of $ = 5% to 20%) and still reproduce the observed influenza phylogenic 
structure. This is in excellent agreement with the results we derive here. There 
may in fact be a grain of truth in the old adage “that which does not kill you 
makes you stronger”, if indeed only slightly (and temporarily).  
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Supplementary information   
Materials and Methods 
Summaries of past 25 influenza seasons in the U.S. were obtained from 
references [31]-[43]. Additional information about year-to-year influenza vaccine 
composition was obtained from references [44] and [45]. 
 To calculate the degree of temporary broad-spectrum immunity needed 
to explain the observed suppression of influenza B epidemics after early and 
severe influenza A epidemics, we examine the scenario where a fraction  of 
the population has been infected with influenza A, subsequently conferring 
broad-spectrum immunity to a fraction  of those people. We also assume that 
a fraction  of the population already has vaccination immunity to influenza B, 
and that  and  are independent (i.e., that prior vaccination for influenza B 
neither increases nor decreases one#s chances for catching influenza A). In the 
immediate aftermath of an influenza A epidemic, a fraction v of the population 
thus has vaccination immunity to influenza B, and a further fraction  has 
broad-spectrum immunity conferred by the infection with influenza A. The total 
“herd immunity” fraction in this case is thus .   
The reproduction number, , of a disease is the mean number of 
secondary cases a typical single infected case will generate in a population with 
no immunity to the disease. If a fraction  of the population has prior immunity 
to the disease, then the of the disease is effectively reduced to . 
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As soon as , the disease will die out in the population.  In order to fully 
suppress the B epidemic, we thus must have , which implies  
 .  (1)  
Notice that  is the effective  due to vaccination alone. Let us 
refer to this as  , and re-write Equation 1 as  
. (2)  
It is now obvious that the closer  is to 1, the smaller  needs to be to 
completely suppress an influenza B epidemic. In fact, if the fraction of people, , 
infected by influenza A is large (as it is in a pandemic situation), the size of  
needed to suppress B can be quite small indeed.  
The average  for seasonal influenza A and B has been estimated to be 
between roughly 1.1 to 1.7, with an average around 1.3 to 1.4 [46]-[48]. 
Influenza B tends to be less infectious than influenza A, thus it is thought to 
have an  at the lower end of this range[48]. In this analysis we will assume 
the of influenza B is 1.2 to 1.3. Typical influenza vaccination coverage in the 
US is around 23%, but it is estimated that fewer than 50% to 70% of vaccinated 
people actually achieve full immunity[49]-[52]. We thus assume a range of  
between 11% to 16%[48]. Since 1.2 to 1.3, and 11% to 16%, we find 
that the effective  due to vaccination alone is 1.01 to 1.16. To estimate 
, we note that the  of A(H1N1) has been measured to be between 1.4 and 
1.6 (i.e., larger than that of seasonal influenza)[53], and modeling studies using 
different methodologies have estimated that roughly 45% to 70% of the 
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population were infected with A(H1N1) by the end of 2009[54][55]. This is in 
agreement with CDC estimates that 14% to 28% of the population fell ill[56], 
when it is taken into account that only approximately 40% of those infected are 
symptomatic[57]. Further, the CDC estimates that around 20% of the population 
falls ill during a severe influenza season, thus we see that the 2009-10 season 
is roughly comparable to the other influenza seasons where a highly infectious 
strain of influenza A caused an early peak.  
Substituting these numbers for , , and  into Equation 2 yields that  
must be greater than around 0.01 to 0.31 to fully suppress a B epidemic in a 
population with typical vaccination levels. This level of cross-immunity is 
considered to be very weak to weak[16]. Using the cross-immunity disease 
model in [16], we can simulate the dynamics of competition between influenza 
strains with this low level of cross-immunity, and find that it does not 
significantly impact the progression of either epidemic when they occur 
simultaneously. This conclusion is supported by the studies presented in [58].  
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